Essay: The Parsimony of Libertarianism. by Fleming, James E.
Essay 
THE PARSIMONY OF LIBERTARIANISM 
James E. Fleming* 
I want to begin by congratulating Randy Barnett on writing 
The Structure of Liberty/ one of the most radical and provoca-
tive works of political and legal theory that I have ever read. I 
consider myself to be a liberal who prizes liberty. Barnett claims 
to provide an account of the structure of liberty along with "[t]he 
liberal conception of justice" and the rule of law.2 His is a radi-
cal libertarian account centrally concerned with protecting the 
fundamental natural rights of property, first possession, freedom 
of contract, and self-defense. In Barnett's world, the fabled lib-
ertarian night-watchman state has been downsized and privat-
ized: It is a world of private courts, private police, and private 
prisons where inmates work to earn enough money to pay resti-
tution to their victims. 
If this is liberalism, it is enough to make me an anti-liberal, 
at least of the civic republican, progressive, and radical feminist 
strains. Indeed, for years I have been defending liberalism 
against criticisms by such anti-liberals, charging that they were 
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Liberty" during the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Janu-
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1. Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 
(Clarendon Press, 1998). 
2. Id. at 63-83. 
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attacking a caricature of liberalism. Well, Barnett's book em-
bodies the caricature of liberalism that they attack. I mean this 
as a compliment: His book provides a caricature of liberalism by 
boldly exaggerating some of its characteristic features, in par-
ticular, its libertarianism and its fear of state power. Indeed, 
Barnett's The Structure of Liberty should join (if not replace) 
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia3 in the standard, 
obligatory footnote references to libertarian political and legal 
theory. 
There is much to praise and much to criticize in Barnett's 
provocative book, and it deserves vigorous and thoroughgoing 
engagement I shall focus on three points. The first relates to 
his account of "the" liberal conception of justice. The second 
concerns his natural law method of reasoning, in particular, his 
ambitious expansion of H.L.A. Hart's famous notion of the 
minimum content of natural law. The third relates to his account 
of the rule of law, in particular, his aggressive elaboration of Lon 
Fuller's well-known conception of the formal principles of legal-
ity to include a requirement of "compossibility" and the parsi-
mony of rights. Thus, my essay is titled "The Parsimony of Lib-
ertarianism." 
I. "THE" LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 
John Rawls gave his classic work of political theory the 
modest title A Theory of Justice.4 Barnett labors under no such 
modesty. He claims to develop "[t]he liberal conception of jus-
tice. "5 To be sure, he sometimes calls his conception that of "the 
classical liberal approach."6 But he does not systematically dis-
tinguish, or articulate the connection, between his conception of 
liberalism and other, non-classical versions of it. If both Rawls 
and Barnett are liberals, we must ask, "How capacious is the 
tradition of liberalism?"7 
As I stated previously, I have spent years defending liberal-
ism against anti-liberal critics, including civic republicans, pro-
gressives, and radical feminists. My move is generally to argue 
that (a broadly Rawlsian) liberalism is more capacious than such 
3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974). 
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U. Press, 1971). 
5. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 63-83 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added). 
6. Id. at 15. 
7. I have benefited from discussing with Samuel Freeman the question of whether 
libertarianism is a liberal view at all. He thinks not. 
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anti-liberals have recognized and to argue that liberalism, prop-
erly conceived or reconstructed, can be synthesized with civic 
republicanism, progressivism, and feminism.8 The resulting lib-
eral republicanism or liberal feminism yields a conclusion that 
liberalism can sponsor a limited formative project. Under such a 
liberalism, government should secure the basic liberties that are 
preconditions for self-government in two senses: not only delib-
erative democracy but also deliberative autonomy. Securing 
these two sorts of preconditions, I argue, would afford everyone 
the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship 
in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy. 
In making such moves, I sometimes explicitly and some-
times implicitli distance liberalism from classical liberalism or 
libertarianism. Barnett's book prompts the question: Should 
liberalism be capacious enough to include libertarian theories 
like his? Or should it exclude such theories, notwithstanding 
Barnett's claim to develop "the" liberal conception of justice? 
In analyzing the development of the tradition of liberalism from 
classical liberalism to contemporary liberalism, Stephen Holmes 
has argued that it has been characterized by a shifting under-
standing of insecurity, ranging from fear of state power to fear of 
"private" power. 10 Barnett's liberalism reflects no such shift in 
the understanding of the sources of insecurity: The only ground 
of insecurity in his account is the fear of state power.11 Or, with 
respect to other sources of insecurity that might seem to call for 
the intervention of state power, he argues that the medicine is 
"far more troublesome and dangerous than the disease. "12 
What is at stake here is whether liberalism, properly so 
called, can justify a limited formative project of government to 
secure the preconditions for self-government through legislation. 
Such a formative project would share (some) common ground 
with civic republicanism, progressivism, and radical feminism. 
8. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 
(1995) ("Fleming, Securing"); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitu· 
tion, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993) ("Fleming, Constructing"); James E. Fleming and Linda 
C. McOain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509 (1997) (book re· 
view); see also Linda C. McOain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion 
of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 19 
(1998). 
9. See, e.g., Fleming, Securing at 43-46 (cited in note 8). 
10. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 
257·60 (U. of Chicago Press, 1995). 
11. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 238·50 (cited in note 1). 
12. I d. at 302 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
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Barnett's version of liberalism radically questions the justice and 
the legitimacy of such legislation (and, for that matter, practi-
cally all legislation). Indeed, if there were a contest as to what 
work of libertarian theory runs the most pages before acknowl-
edging the existence of legislatures and of legislation, Barnett's 
book might win: legislation is not mentioned until page 124. 
And even there, he does not acknowledge the legitimacy of leg-
islation. Instead, in the course of waxing eloquent about the 
characteristics of common-law adjudication, he expresses doubts 
about the original idea that errors in the common law "were 
supposed to be corrected by occasional acts of legislation. "13 He 
goes on to complain: "Today, legislation is hardly extraordina~ 
and is hardly confined to correcting doctrinal errors of courts." 4 
He continues: 
Indeed, for some time now the legislative process has tended 
to overshadow and even to supplant common-law processes 
as the principal engine of legal discovery and change. This 
has meant that legal evolution has sometimes been replaced 
by legal revolution-and the disruption and hubris that typi-
cally accompanies revolutions-as the dominant approach to 
legal change.15 
Even more remarkably, in a section on "[l]aw and [l]egislation" 
in his fable imagining a polycentric constitutional order, he does 
not refer to legislation enacted by legislatures.16 Instead, he 
states that "judicial opinions are commonly supplemented by 
reference to 'codes' or legislation written by authoritative out-
side institutions" such as the American Law Institute's Restate-
ments of the Laws or the legal experts who write treatises.17 
I am grateful to Barnett for sharpening and clarifying the 
differences between classical liberalism and the liberalism that I 
wish to develop and defend (by synthesizing it with civic republi-
canism, progressivism, and feminism). And I am grateful to him 
for providing me with a citation to use in deflecting anti-liberal 
critiques of liberalism. I no longer have to object that they at-
tack a caricature of liberalism. Instead, I can employ a strategy 
of confession and avoidance: I can confess that their criticisms 
are well-taken against versions of liberalism like Barnett's, but I 
13. Id. at 124. 
14. ld. 
15. ld. 
16. Id. at 284-97. 
17. Id. at289. 
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can avoid those criticisms by arguing that they do not apply to 
versions of liberalism like Rawls's (or for that matter, Ronald 
Dworkin's,18 Bruce Ackerman's,19 or my own). 
Here we should ask Barnett, just how capacious is liberal-
ism? Does he mean, by claiming to elaborate "the" liberal con-
ception of justice, to write Rawls, Dworkin, and others out of the 
canon of liberalism? How would he conceive the core, and the 
boundaries, of liberalism? How does he conceive the differ-
ences, and the connections, between his conception of liberalism 
and those of Rawls, Dworkin, and others? 
II. THENATURALLAWMETHOD OF ANALYSIS 
A 
Barnett opens his book with a perspicacious account of 
what he calls "The Natural Law Method of Analysis."20 He 
rightly points out that the idea of natural law, despite its long 
and distinguished pedigree, is mysterious to many today.21 And 
he proudly and expertly contributes to the revival or reconstruc-
tion of natural law and natural rights that is currently underway. 
He seeks to demystify the idea of natural law reasoning, de-
scribing it as a "hypothetical imperative"22 method of reasoning 
with the following structure: "Given that the nature of human 
beings and the world in which they live is X, if we want to 
achieve Y, then we ought to do Z. "23 
Barnett imaginatively interprets H.L.A. Hart's well-known 
notion of "the minimum content of natural law"24 in terms of 
that structure or method of reasoning.25 According to Barnett, 
"Hart takes as 'given' five contingent facts about 'human nature 
and the world in which men live': (a) human vulnerability, (b) 
approximate equality, (c) limited altruism, (d) limited resources 
and (e) limited understanding and strength of will. "26 Barnett 
18. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
19. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 
1980). 
20. Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 4-12 (cited in note 1). 
21. I d. at 4. 
22. Id. at 7. 
23. ld. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
24. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 189-95 (Oarendon Press, 1961). 
25. Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 10-12 (cited in note 1). 
26. Id. at 11. 
176 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.17:171 
continues: "He then assumes, on the basis of observation, the 
additional contingent fact that most people desire to sur-
vive ... _,v Finally, "Hart concludes that, given these five fac-
tual conditions, if persons desire to survive, then their legal sys-
tems ought to have [certain] features"28 or rules such as those 
which make up what Hart calls "the minimum content of natural 
law."29 
So far so good. Barnett then proceeds to a more ambitious 
elaboration of Hart's "core of good sense" yielded by this type 
of natural law reasoning.30 Here is where the troubles begin. 
First, Barnett expands the given. To Hart's five contingent facts 
about human nature and the world in which humans live, he 
adds three pervasive social problems that confront every society: 
the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.31 Second, he 
expands the if. In addition to Hart's objective of survival, he 
posits three other objectives: the pursuit of happiness, peace, and 
prosperity.32 Finally, Barnett expands the then: from Hart's 
minimum content of natural law to a full-blown libertarian ac-
count of "the liberal conception of justice-as defined by natural 
rights-and the rule of law."33 
I said here is where the troubles begin for the following ba-
sic reason: the appeal or "core of good sense"34 in Hart's notion 
of the "minimum content of natural law"35 lies in its very mini-
malism. Hart was trying to find common ground between the 
traditions of natural law and legal positivism, both by pruning 
the natural law tradition of its grandiose claims about human na-
ture and the necessary connection between law and morality, 
and by pruning the legal positivist tradition of its radical relativ-
ist claims that there was no necessary content to the laws of a le-
gitimate legal system.36 Hart was trying to distill an extremely 
uncontroversial "core of good sense" that all reasonable persons 
could agree upon concerning, in Barnett's terms, the given (the 
picture of human nature and the nature of the world in which 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (emphasis in original). 
29. Id. (quoting Hart, Concept of Law at 189-95 (cited in note 24)) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
30. Id. at 12 (quoting Hart, Concept of Law at 194 (cited in note 24)). 
31. Id.at17. 
32. Id. at 16. 
33. Id. at 22, see also id. at 17. 
34. Hart, Concept of Law at 194 (cited in note 24). 
35. Id. at 189-95. 
36. Id. at 181-89. 
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humans live); the if (the objectives that humans are to pursue); 
and the then (the content of the laws that humans should enact). 
And so, any expansion of the given, the if, or the then in Hart's 
idea of the minimum content of natural law is very likely to lose 
the appeal or the core of good sense in his notion. 
This proves to be the case with Barnett's ambitious elabora-
tion of Hart's idea. His expansions of the given, the if, and the 
then all are extremely controversial, and are at once too much 
and too little in ways that I shall explain. First, consider Bar-
nett's expansion of the given to include the problems of knowl-
edge, interest, and power. This is too much in the sense that the 
given is now far more controversial and problematic than it was 
in Hart's formulation. It is too little in the sense that, once we 
open the door to include the three problems identified by Bar-
nett, numerous other problems will vie for inclusion. To name a 
few: the problem of need, the problem of envy, the problem of 
diversity (or of reasonable moral pluralism), the problem of 
equal concern and respect, the problem of self-respect, the 
problem of care (and of dependency and interdependency), the 
problem of security (and of vulnerability), the problem of real-
izing our capacities, and the like.37 
Barnett may be right in identifying the problems of knowl-
edge, interest, and power as fundamental. Indeed, if they were 
the only or even the primary problems in the world in which we 
live, his proposed resolution of them might make a significant 
and lasting contribution to political and legal theory. He cer-
tainly makes an imaginative and rigorous argument for a liber-
tarian conception of justice and the rule of law from the premise 
that these are the fundamental problems of the human condi-
tion. And we should commend him for being so clear about this 
premise. For his doing so makes clear the glaring omissions in 
his theory. To paraphrase Hart on Holmes, Barnett has the vir-
tue that when he is clearly wrong, he is wrong clearly.38 
But Barnett does not provide a persuasive argument that 
the three problems of knowledge, interest, and power are so 
fundamental that they trump, override, or rule out of bounds 
other problems (or that they exhaust the problems that a con-
ception of justice and the rule of law should address). To be 
37. I understand that Larry Sager advanced this sort of criticism of Barnett in the 
Ouinnipiac conference. 
38. See H.L.A. Hart, Positi-vism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy 49,49 (Oarendon Press, 1983). 
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sure, he alludes to the "other problems" objection in the final 
chapter of the book.39 But that is simply too short a dismissal of 
this criticism. Furthermore, it becomes highly doubtful whether 
Barnett, once he adds the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power to the given, is merely reasoning from facts about human 
nature and the human condition, as he seems to claim,40 rather 
than engaging in moral reasoning or normative political theory.41 
Second, consider Barnett's expansion of the if to include the 
pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity. Again, this is both 
too much and too little. Too much in that, once we move be-
yond the objective of survival, we are dealing with objectives 
that are far more controversial and problematic. Too little in 
that, once we open the door to objectives beyond survival, other 
objectives will compete with the pursuit of happiness, peace, and 
prosperity as candidates for inclusion. For example, to take a 
famous trilogy, what about the ends of equality and fraternity in 
addition to liberty? And what about the ends of human excel-
lence or virtue? Dignity and autonomy? Community? Again, 
Barnett does not adequately defend his decision to focus on the 
pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity to the exclusion or 
neglect of such other objectives. 
Third and finally, I could also make the too much, too little 
objection to Barnett's expansion of the then. It is too much in 
that once we move beyond the minimum content of natural law, 
the content becomes far more controversial and problematic. It 
is too little in that Barnett's libertarian conception of justice 
seems merely to be a conception of liberty. It is not a full con-
ception of justice at all, not even after he goes through eight re-
finements or formulations of it.42 Rather, it is a conception of 
liberty that acknowledges constraints on liberty, but only for the 
sake of liberty, not also for the sake of other principles, rights, or 
values.43 
The point of my criticisms concerning the natural law 
method of reasoning is not that it is inappropriate for Barnett 
ambitiously to build upon Hart's analysis, or to engage in the 
natural law method of reasoning. And I certainly do not wish to 
39. Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 325-26 (cited in note 1). 
40. Id. at 4-12. 
41. I understand that Arthur Ripstein developed a version of this type of criticism 
at the Quinnipiac conference. Sandy Levinson also did so at the AALS panel. 
42. Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 83, 102, 104, 159, 181, 190, 205,214 (cited in 
note 1). 
43. Id. at 63-83. 
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imply that any political theory or legal theory, to be acceptable, 
must be uncontroversial or must command the assent of all rea-
sonable persons. Far from it. My point rather is that Barnett, by 
expanding Hart's idea of the minimum content of natural law, 
loses the appeal or the core of good sense in his notion. Again, 
the key to Hart's success is the very minimalism of his idea of the 
minimum content of natural law. 
B 
Barnett does not develop a full-blown constitutional theory 
in The Structure of Liberty, nor does he advance a natural law 
method of constitutional interpretation.44 But the book's impli-
cations for constitutional theory are clear enough. Barnett sug-
gests that the principles he identifies as part of the liberal con-
ception of justice and the rule of law inform the meaning of the 
"rights 'retained by the people' that the Ninth Amendment says 
shall not be 'denied or disparaged' or of the 'privileges or immu-
nities of citizens' protected from state infringement by the Four-
teenth Amendment," as well as the meaning of "due process of 
law" mentioned in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.45 He 
also makes clear that he would inte!Pret the Takings Clause,46 
the Necessary and Proper Clause,47 the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms,48 and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition 
of involuntary servitude49 in light of his conception of justice and 
the rule of law. Furthermore, in another work he has called for 
getting normative in constitutional theory by engagng in natural 
rights reasoning in constitutional interpretation. And so it 
seems appropriate to raise some doubts about interpreting the 
Constitution along the lines he suggests. 
One objection, paraphrasing Holmes's dissent in Lochner, 
might be that the Constitution does not enact Mr. Randy Bar-
nett's The Structure of LibertJ, any more than it enacts Mr. Her-
bert Spencer's Social Statics. 1 I usually am skeptical about such 
44. Barnett is developing a full-blown constitutional theory in a book in progress, 
The Presumption of Libeny. 
45. Id. at 25 & n.79. 
46. ld. at 25. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 238-39. 
49. Id. at 248-49. 
50. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 12 Const. Comm. 93 (1995). 
51. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"). 
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paraphrases of Holmes's dissent, with all their smugness and 
their purported dispositive, conversation-stopping force.52 But 
here I think that such an invocation of Holmes's dissent is par-
ticularly apt, given the family resemblance between Barnett's 
libertarianism and Spencer's (even if Barnett does not obviously 
subscribe to a social Darwinism of the sort attributed to 
Spencer).53 
Another objection might be that Barnett's liberal concep-
tion of justice does not comport with the original understanding 
of the Constitution. One version of this criticism would be that 
the founding generation did not believe in natural rights or did 
not accept the natural rights method of analysis.54 Another ver-
sion would be that even if they did, they did not believe that 
natural rights were a source of legal claims to be made in a 
court.55 Yet another, more specific, version would be that the 
founding generation did not accept libertarian views of the 
Takings Clause of the sort Barnett would advance56 and that a 
fortiori they would not have accepted his full liberal conception 
of justice and the rule of law. 
I do not intend to make any of these objections. Instead, I 
want to make two different objections: one, that it is not persua-
sive to ground a liberal constitutional conception of justice on 
the prepolitical conception of human nature that Barnett de-
ploys; and two, that Barnett's liberal conception of justice, ap-
plied to interpreting our Constitution, would not adequately fit 
or justify our constitutional document and practice. 
First, Barnett purports to ground his liberal conception of 
justice on a prepolitical conception of human nature (indeed, on 
an account of the facts of human nature ).57 I sympathize with the 
idea of grounding our basic liberties on a conception of the per-
son. But, following Rawls, I have attempted to ground our basic 
liberties on a rather different conception of the person: a con-
ception of the person as free and equal citizen, and as having two 
52. See, e.g., Fleming, Securing at 43-44 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructing at 
301-04 (cited in note 8). 
53. See Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 73,76 (cited in note 1). 
54. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
39 (Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
55. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 Yale L.J. 907,932-33 (1993). 
56. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782,819-25 (1995). 
57. See Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 4-12 (cited in note 1). 
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moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity 
for a conception of the good. 58 Applying this idea, I worked up a 
constitutional theory with two fundamental themes correspond-
ing to these two moral powers: securing the basic liberties that 
are necessary for deliberative democracy and securing the basic 
liberties that are necessary for deliberative autonomy. Together, 
these two themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed 
status of free and equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic con-
stitutional democracy.59 
Note that this conception of the person does not purport to 
be a prepolitical conception of the person, or to stem from the 
facts of human nature. Rather, it is a political conception of the 
person, and it is a construct that is posited in order to account 
for, and provide a basis for justifying, the basic liberties that 
comprise an ongoing practice and tradition of constitutional de-
mocracy. The claim is that these basic liberties are expressed in 
or presupposed by our constitutional document and underlying 
constitutional order.60 
Here I would like to play upon the title of an article by Bar-
nett, Getting Normative: 61 If he gets normative by getting natu-
ralist, I get normative by getting constructivist.62 We need not 
and should not get normative by getting naturalist. My construc-
tivist conception is not foundationalist or moral realist. It recog-
nizes the independence of constitutional theory from deep, con-
troversial metaphysical questions of philosophy. Most 
importantly, it recognizes the irrelevance, for the content of 
rights, of their status as natural rights. It is decidedly, and de-
signedly, less deep, if you will, than foundationalist or moral re-
alist accounts. For this very reason, I submit, it is more appro-
priate as a method of constitutional interpretation than is 
Barnett's natural rights method. Constructivism also has the vir-
tue of charting a third way between natural law and legal posi-
tivism. 
58. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 19,302, 332 (Columbia U. Press, 1993). 
59. See Fleming, Securing at 19-20 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructing at 287-
898 (cited in note 8). 
60. See Rawls, Political Liberalism at 29-35, 299-304 (cited in note 58). 
61. Barnett, 12 Const. Comm. at 93 (cited in note 50). 
62. In other works, I have outlined and developed a constitutional constructivism 
by analogy to Rawls's political constructivism, a theory developed in his book Political 
Liberalism. See Fleming, Securing at 2, 17-23 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructing at 
217, 281-97 (cited in note 8). 
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The second reason that we should reject Barnett's liberal 
conception of justice in interpreting the Constitution is be-
cause-using the terms of Dworkin's two dimensions of best in-
terpretation, fit and justification-it does not ade~uately fit or 
justify our constitutional document and practice. 3 Barnett's 
radical libertarian conception would entail that much, if not 
most, of our practice is unconstitutional; that many, if not most, 
of our precedents are wrongly decided; and that much, if not 
most, of our federal and state legislation is unconstitutional. I 
certainly do not mean to imply that the best constitutional the-
ory may not be critical of some of our practices, precedents, and 
legislation. Still, to be eligible as a constitutional theory, it must 
fit most while criticizing some. I do not wish to seem to take a 
dim view of political theory that is radical, in the sense of making 
recourse to first principles and being willing to criticize much of 
extant practice as unjust. But I do mean to say that Barnett's 
book, precisely to the extent that it is eye-opening and laudable 
as a work of radical political theory, is problematic in its implica-
tions for constitutional theory. Again, I daresay that it (ex-
trapolated to constitutional theory) would fail both the test of fit 
and justification. In sum, his political theory is so radical that, as 
a matter of constitutional interpretation, it is out of bounds. 
III. THE RULE OF LAW: COMPOSSIBILITY AND THE 
PARSIMONY OF LIBERTARIANISM 
If my second criticism focused on Barnett's ambitious ex-
pansion of a feature of H.L.A. Hart's legal theory, it is perhaps 
appropriate that my third criticism focuses on Barnett's expan-
sion of a feature of Lon Fuller's legal theory (given the promi-
nence in a prior generation of the Hart-Fuller debate on there-
lationship between law and morality). In elaborating upon rule 
of law principles, Barnett draws upon Fuller's well-known ac-
count of the formal principles of legality (or the eight ways Rex 
can fail to make law).64 Fuller's fifth principle-proscribing the 
enactment of contradictory rules65 -seems innocuous and un-
problematic enough in itself. But Barnett reads "[t]he 
63. For Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and 
justification, see, e.g, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 239 (Harvard U. Press, 1986); 
Ronald Dworkm, A Matter of Principle 143-45 (Harvard U. Press, 1985); Dworkin, Tak-
ing Rights Seriously at 107 (cited in note 18). 
64. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 89-99 (cited in note 1) (drawing upon Lon 
L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38-39 (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1%9)). 
65. Fuller, Morality of Law at 39 (cited in note 64). 
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[r]equirement of [c]ompossibility" into it.66 That requirement 
forbids conflict among rights, or proscribes recognizing any 
rights that conflict with other rights.6 
Barnett takes issue with the common view that valid rights 
may conflict with each other.68 In particular, he criticizes Jeremy 
Waldron's treatment of rights in conflict. According to Barnett: 
Waldron ... argues that with theories of rights based on in-
terests, conflicts of rights are nearly inevitable and require 
"trade-offs" among rights. Waldron would make some of 
these trade-offs by "establish[ing] the relative importance of 
the interests at stake ... " and by "try[ing] to maximize our 
promotion of what we take to be important." In other cases, 
he would establish an "internal relation between moral con-
siderations" to handle conflicting claims of rights. 69 
Barnett rejects this view. He argues that it results in part from 
an inflation of mere claims into rights and in part from ignoring 
the informational role played by a comgossible set of rights, that 
is, a set of rights that do not conflict. He argues instead that 
rights must be compossible: "In a perfectly compossible set of 
rights, every right could be exercised according to its terms with-
out any right in the set conflicting with any other."71 He con-
tends: "The compossibility of rights is functionally necessary to 
achieving an order of actions, because people need the informa-
tion that rights provide as to how they may act to pursue happi-
ness while avoiding conflicts with the actions of others. "72 
Furthermore, Barnett argues that "Fuller's fifth require-
ment of legality argues for a parsimony of rights. "73 Therefore, 
he argues: "However attractive a particular claim of right may 
be, if it conflicts with other rights that are essential to solving the 
knowledge problem-such as the rights to several property or to 
freedom of contract-it violates the re~uirement of compossi-
bility and its validity is highly suspect." This is a remarkable 
66. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 90-94 (cited in note 1). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 91. 
69. Id. at 93 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, in Liberal Rights: Col-
lected Papers 1981-1991 at 203, 223-24 (Cambridge U. Press, 1993)) (alterations in origi-
nal). 
70. ld. at 91, 93. 
71. ld. at 92. 
72. ld. 
73. Id. at 91. 
74. ld. at 92. 
184 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:171 
case of form- the concern for com possibility and parsimony-
placin~ important constraints on substance, as Barnett acknowl-
edges. It is remarkable to presume that Barnett's favored 
rights trump all other rights simply because of the requirement 
of compossibility and a tidy concern to avoid, in advance, the 
possibility of conflicts among rights. Waldron is certainly right 
to observe that "the price for this tidiness is a severe limitation 
on the types of moral concerns that can be articulated [as 
rights]."76 We should ask whether such tidiness is worth the 
price. I think not. 
I conclude this despite the fact that to some extent I share 
Barnett's concern for parsimony or, as I would put it, elegance in 
the construction of a theory, and despite the fact that I too be-
lieve that we should take rights seriously, as trumps rather than 
as mere interests to be traded off or balanced against each other 
or against governmental interests. There is a serious problem 
concerning the criterion for determining priority in resolving or 
avoiding conflicts that Barnett does not adequately face up to. 
Even if we accept the requirement of compossibility for the sake 
of argument, what entitles the rights to several property and 
freedom of contract to priority over other asserted rights when 
we apply that requirement to resolve or avoid conflicts between 
rights? Barnett seems simply to assume that his rights have pri-
ority because they are, on his account, necessary to solve the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power. He seems implic-
itly to take a "first in time, first in right" approach here: Because 
he has already elaborated these rights, and thus they already are 
on hand, they have priority over any other rights than anyone 
else might wish to assert. 
Later in the book, Barnett again argues for a parsimony of 
rights, arrivinH at what he calls "a natural rights version of Ock-
ham's razor." There he argues that "rights are a necessary evil" 
rather than an unmitigated good.78 Ironically, rights are a neces-
sary evil because, although we think of them as protecting us 
against governmental power, they "legitimate the use of [gov-
ernmental] force or violence to secure compliance."79 Therefore, 
he worries, "[t]he more rights we recognize the more violence 
75. Id. 
76. Waldron, Liberal Rights at 204 (cited in note 69). 
77. Barnett, The Structure of Libeny at 200 (cited in note 1). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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we legitimate."80 He continues: "Because each right legitimates 
violence, the fewer we can manage with the better."81 He con-
cludes: "Thus we arrive at a natural rights version of Ockham's 
razor: To reduce the legitimated use of power in society that en-
forceable rights engender, any social problems, no matter how 
serious, that can be handled adequately by other means should 
be. "82 
In my own writing in constitutional theory, I have pressed a 
theme concerning "the importance of being elegant" (though not 
too reductive) in constructing a constitutional theory.83 My con-
cern for elegance has affinity to Barnett's concern for parsimony. 
I have used the criterion of elegance in arguing for the superior-
ity of my constitutional theory over other theories, for example, 
that of Bruce Ackerman.84 I argued that a constitutional theory 
of the sort I have developed, with the two fundamental themes 
of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, can more 
elegantly, straightforwardly, and plausibly account for our dual-
ist constitutional scheme and the basic liberties that it secures 
than can Ackerman's unwieldy theory.85 
I use the criterion of elegance in choosing among competing 
accounts of our basic liberties and scheme of government, all of 
which claim to fit and justify our constitutional document and 
practice. Barnett, by contrast, does not use elegance, parsimony, 
or Ockham's razor to choose among competing accounts of a 
given phenomenon. For example, he does not argue that his ac-
count more parsimoniously accounts for a given set of rights 
than do other, less elegant, theories. Instead, he uses parsimony 
and Ockham's razor to shave off claims of rights that conflict 
with the rights favored by his libertarian conception of justice. 
(Actually, he uses them more like an ax to clear the field of 
claims of rights that conflict with the rights he favors.) And so, I 
prefer to speak of "the parsimony of libertarianism" or "Randy's 
razor." Or, deploying a negative connotation of parsimony, to 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. ld. (citations omitted). 
83. See Fleming, Securing at 29 (cited in note 8). 
84. James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1513, 1535-36 (1998). Ackerman's theory, with its complex apparatus of three republics 
and of amendment and transformation of the Constitution outside the formal procedures 
of Article V, is inelegant. "By his own self-deprecating characterization, it may appear to 
be an 'unworkable Rube Goldberg contraption."' Id. at 1535 (citing Bruce Ackerman, 
We the People: Foundations 61 (Harvard U. Press,1991)). 
85. ld. at 1536. 
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speak of "the poverty of libertarianism." In conclusion, I would 
argue for the importance of being elegant in constructing a con-
stitutional theory but also for the importance of not being too 
parsimonious or stingy in the recognition of rights. 
